Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation in India was 6.7% y/y in July, down from 7.8% in April, as sequential
momentum in food inflation eased. Core inflation (CPI excluding food and beverages, fuel and light) was at
5.8% in July after averaging 6% in FY22. Real time prices of edible oils have eased but that of cereals, pulses
and some vegetables are moving up.
During April-July of FY23, central government net tax revenue growth was 26% y/y while total expenditure
grew 12% and capital expenditure has remained buoyant. Fiscal deficit so far is thus 20.5% of FY23 budget
estimate. Small savings inflow during April-July 2022 was Rs. 4,271cr higher than that during the same period
of last year. GST collection remained robust at Rs. 1.44 lakh crore and 28% y/y during August.
Industrial production (IP) growth was 12.3% y/y in June after 19.6% in May. On a seasonally adjusted monthon-
month basis, it was 1.3% in June after 0.4% in May. Output momentum turned strong for consumer durable
and non-durable goods categories while it weakened for the rest. Infrastructure Industries output (40% weight
in IP) was again down 3.2% m/m seasonally adjusted in July, after falling 2% in May and 0.5% in June, with
sequential output growth in all categories except that of steel being negative.
Bank credit outstanding as on 12th August was up 15.3% y/y and has averaged 12.2% in the latest ten fortnights
(up from 8% during January-March), likely also due to higher inflation and thus higher demand for working
capital. Bank deposit growth was at 8.8%. Credit flow till date during the financial year has been higher in FY22
than in FY20 and FY21 while deposit flow has been much lower. During FY22, overall bank credit flow was the
highest for personal loans and lowest for industries.
Merchandise trade deficit moderated mildly to USD 28.7bn in August, after rising for four consecutive months
to USD 30bn in July. While both oil and non-oil exports fell sequentially, non-oil-non-gold imports remain
elevated despite some moderation in August. Trade deficit has averaged USD 22.2bn during September-
August vs. USD 10.8bn during April-August 2021. During the same period, non-oil-non-gold imports picked up
to an average of USD 38.3bn from USD 29.3bn.
Among higher-frequency variables, number of motor vehicles registered has moderated since May and energy
consumption level is close to 2021 although it has eased after June. Monthly number of GST e-way bills
generated has stayed robust.
US headline CPI eased to 8.5% y/y in July from 9.1% in June while Core CPI stayed flat at 5.9%. Sequential
momentum in headline CPI was flat, driven by a drop in energy prices but also by other durable goods and
services. However, housing rent momentum stayed high. US non-farm payroll addition in August (315,000
persons) was below that in July (526,000 persons) but was still above expectation. Unemployment rate inched
up from 3.5% in July to 3.7% in August and sequential growth in average hourly earnings was lower. However,
labour force participation rate and employment-population ratio ticked up. The FOMC (Federal Open Market
Committee) increased the target range for the federal funds rate by 75bps for the second time in July, a total
of 225bps since March. The Fed Governor, in his recent speech at the Jackson Hole symposium, stressed on
the need to restore price stability by maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time and that this could
involve a sustained period of below-trend growth and softer labour markets.
Manufacturing PMI for China stayed in the non-expansionary territory (i.e. below 50 reading) in July and
August. Total credit flow (except government bonds) and fixed asset investments continue to remain soft
while consumer confidence and property market indicators (like prices, floor space under construction, etc.)
remain very weak. China recently cut its five-year Loan Prime Rate by 15bps to 4.3%. However, power outages
due to heat waves in certain parts of the country and renewed lockdowns in various districts, as part of China's
Zero Covid Strategy, have increased risks to the growth outlook which was already expected to slow.
Outlook
1. More pronounced signs of economic breakage
It is evident now that economic growth is slowing appreciably around the world. While this is widely
acknowledged by now, one suspects the extent of the eventual slowdown is still not. There seems to be
momentum to the slowdown given the context of more restrictive fiscal policy now and the fact that central
banks will widely keep monetary conditions tighter for longer. While China is loosening policy on the margin,
there are multiple constraints here both on the quantum of easing possible and the net effect of the same.
Thus the only (temporary) respite to the downward momentum to global growth could potentially be
from a possible cessation of war and a consequent sharp correction in energy prices (this is mentioned
as a possible scenario here and not a view). Barring that, one would expect the higher momentum data
slowdown to eventually feed into the 'stickier' parts of the world economy.
In India, have two distinct advantages going for us. One, a long period issue on local corporate and bank
balance sheets is now behind us. This has been a significant cyclical drag over the past many years which has
now turned into a tailwind. Two, India's total monetary and fiscal policy response to Covid has been measured
and responsible. This implies that there is very little overhang to deal with of excess stimulus from the past
unlike in the case of many developed economies. This is also the main reason behind our view that India
needn't follow the US lockstep in monetary tightening and that we can afford for our effective overnight rate
to peak below 6% in this cycle. Returning to point, however, the cycle and policy tailwinds are ensuring that
we now grow more robustly than many other nations around the world. The relative growth advantage will
likely sustain going forward. However, the absolute growth acceleration that we have witnessed over the
past few months will have to slow reflecting the weakening global growth. This starts through the export
channel, as it already has, and then proceeds to impact local consumption and investments down the line.
2. Stabler rate hike expectations in DMs from here
Global rate hike expectations were in constant iteration mode (read being continually revised upwards) for
most of this year till mid-June. Post that things took a breather. For a while as signs of economic breakage
started to become clearer, markets began running somewhat ahead of themselves by not just lowering their
terminal rate forecasts but in some cases even building significant rate cuts for late 2023 in some developed
markets. As an example, around mid-July approximately 80 bps rate cuts were being priced in for the US
next year. Over the past few weeks, on the back of active central bank pushes against this idea helped with
continued upward pressure on European inflation, 'sense' seems to have returned. This has been evidenced in
both terminal rate pricing going up as well as an expectation now that they will be at higher levels for longer.
This is now more consistent with the message delivered, as an example, by Fed Chair Powell in his recent
Jackson Hole speech. In Europe, policy tightening expectations had built in significantly till mid -June but then
unwound appreciably on the back of weaker economic data. However, with inflation concerns going up further
and with ECB seemingly showing firm resolve to contain it, rate hike expectations have sharply risen again.
These gyrations are best reflected in the movement of German 2-year bond yields over the past few months.
The UK has also seen very sharp recent additions to rate hike expectations from the market.
Given all of the recent building back of rate hike expectations, and with clear signs of economic breakage
becoming more pronounced, it is unlikely that incoming data leads to more than, say, a 25 bps upward
change in expectations from the current levels in most major DMs. Pricing is already for peak rates in this
cycle being significantly higher than what are termed as long term neutral rates and thus incoming data
needs to very sharply surprise for this to move even higher by a significant step.
Turning home, rate hike expectations with respect to RBI seem to also now be stabilising. To recap, these
expectations had become quite unanchored post the inter-meeting hike in May. While we had held on to our
view of peak effective rates in this cycle at sub-6% (basis our reading of the current global macro cycle as well
as India's total, relatively modest, post Covid policy response), market pricing was far in excess of this at 'peak
fear' after the May event. However, now here as well market seems to be converging towards a peak repo rate
of 6 - 6.25% which is much closer to what we have been thinking. Our view of peak effective overnight rate
of 5.75% is consistent with a terminal repo of 6% with overnight rates round the SDF, 25 bps below.
3. Tighter global financial conditions and possible implications
While DM sovereign rates may be more range bound from here, this doesn't mean that we are done with
tightening in global financial conditions. As rates stay tighter for longer in the face of economic breakage,
this may get evidenced more in the usual risk off trades like stronger DM currencies and wider corporate
bond spreads (DM corporate bond spreads are still relatively well behaved and seem to have significant room
to expand). Many emerging market (EM) bond yields are also like 'spread' assets for global capital. Thus, a
tighter for longer policy environment in DMs will entail stricter financial conditions and hence a widening
of spreads. This may impact yields in many EMs as well.
Over the first half of the year when the world was readjusting its expectation of global monetary tightening,
the linkage to Indian bonds was largely through interest rate swaps rather than outright bond selling by
foreign investors in a big way. Most of the capital outflows were instead from the equities markets. This
probably reflects the fact that active foreign interest has been missing from Indian bonds over the past few
years and hence the amount of rebalancing out may also consequently be lower. Portfolio rebalancing on
possible another bout of risk aversion ahead may not impact India's bonds significantly. Also, with spread
between bond and swap having opened up (5 year government bond yields were around 60 bps over 5
year swap yields at the time of writing), there is room for this to compress without significantly impacting
underlying bond yields.
However, this doesn't mean that local bonds are immune to global financial conditions tightening. This needs
to be still respected, in our view. As an example, lately the local bond market is abuzz with expectations that
India is on the cusp of being included in at least one of the large global sovereign bond indices. The argument
heard is that this time around this is on 'pull' from investors desiring some diversification to their EM exposures.
Hence it may go through even without associated facilitators that required leeway on taxation which apparently
our policymakers were against. The expectation is that the while flows associated with actual index inclusion may take some time, and the weight assigned to Indian bonds in the index itself would only gradually go up,
other 'fast money' flow may pre-empt this and already start coming in. Basis this expectation, one has seen
a bull flattening over the past few sessions thereby further flattening the 5 to 10 year yield spread, as local
participants have taken positions in longer duration bonds anticipating this announcement.
We have no idea how far this can stretch in the near term. However, nothing changes to our underlying view
that if there's one point of concern that bond markets ought to have over the medium term, it is the amount
of duration supply. This is both on account of higher than pre-pandemic averages on likely fiscal deficit
over the next few years as well as a shift higher in annual bond maturities over the next many years from
what was the case in the past. Even adjusted for nominal growth in participant balance sheets, this is a
significant step up in duration supply and likely needs support from a demand standpoint. Absent offshore
investors, RBI would have eventually stepped in to buy bonds as a means to expand its balance sheet. With
index inclusion, offshore investors will buy bonds and RBI will get the dollars to expand balance sheet.
Then RBI wouldn't need to buy bonds. Either way, over the medium term, the eventual effect on bond
yields may be similar.
Thus, the issue of duration absorption may still persist after the initial euphoria on index inclusion subsides.
Also, this would be in what is a tighter global financing environment. In India too even as our peak rate
expectations are in place, we would expect RBI to hold them there for longer. Thus investors should
continue to want higher risk premia from yields for holding higher duration over the medium term. Also
given how unforgiving the global environment is, we don't want to be too 'tactical' with our portfolio
strategies by trying to chase the bull flattening. All told then, we continue to find the most value in 4-5
year government bonds.